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JURISDICTION
Petitioner Stephen E. Hausknecht ("Hausknecht") seeks review
of an Order of the Industrial Commission of Utah granting Kennecott
Corporation's

("Kennecott")

Motion

for

Review

and

denying

Hausknecht's request for a formal evidentiary hearing. (Copies of
the Order Granting Motion for Review and Order of Clarification are
attached as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively).

As discussed below,

this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider
this appeal because Hausknecht's Petition for Review was untimely
and improperly filed.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Did Hausknecht file a Petition for Review with the Court

of Appeals on or before December 6, 1993?
Standard of Review:
2.

Did

the

Not applicable.

Industrial

Commission

of

Utah

violate

Hausknecht's right to due process by reversing its Administrative
Law Judge's decision to grant Hausknecht#s request for a formal
evidentiary hearing?
Standard of Review:
issue has been properly

Kennecott does not concede that this
raised, either below or on appeal.

However, if the issue is properly before the Court of Appeals, the
Court "shall grant relief only if. on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has
108331

been substantially prejudiced" by unconstitutional agency action or
an unconstitutional statute or rule on which the agency action is
based.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).

This Court has held that whether an administrative agency has
afforded a petitioner due process is a question of law to which the
Court will not defer to agency actions.

Lopez v. Career Services

Review Board. 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992).
3.

Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err by finding that

Hausknecht failed to show that a formal evidentiary hearing is
necessary pursuant to the requirements of R560-1-4 of the Utah
Administrative Code?
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals "shall grant relief
only if. on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced"
by the agency's erroneous interpretation or application of the law.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1994) (emphasis added).
In determining whether the agency has erroneously interpreted
or applied the law, this Court has held that mixed questions of law
and fact and interpretation of an agency's regulations will be
reviewed under an intermediate standard whereby the agency decision
is

accorded

some

deference

and

will

be

affirmed

if

it

is

"reasonable and rational." Vali Convalescent and Care Institute v.
DOH. 797 P.2d 438, 443 (Utah App. 1990); Hurley v. Board of Review
of Industrial Commission. 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988).
108331
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Pursuant
Procedure,

to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Kennecott

has

attached

copies

of

all

relevant

provisions, statutes and rules as Exhibit 3.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.
age

On or about May 12, 1992, Hausknecht filed a charge of

discrimination

against

Kennecott

with

the

Utah

Anti-

discrimination Division ("UADD") of the Industrial Commission of
Utah.

(Attached as Exhibit 4.)

2.

On that same day, the UADD sent a Request for Information

to Kennecott.
3.

(Attached as Exhibit 5.)

On June 10, 1992 Kennecott responded to the Request for

Information and Hausknecht's allegation, attaching a copy of
Kennecott#s sexual harassment policy and 58 pages of notes relating
to the termination of Hausknecht's employment.

(Attached as

Exhibit 6.)
4.

On July 22, 1992, Hausknecht responded to Kennecott's

response but did not submit any affidavits or other documentary
evidence.
5.
response.
6.

(Attached as Exhibit 7.)
On August 20, 1992, Kennecott replied to Hausknecht's
(Attached as Exhibit 8.)
After the UADD investigation of Hausknecht's allegation

was complete, the UADD director concluded that Hausknecht had
108331
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"failed to establish a prima facia case of age discrimination" and
entered a no cause determination and order of dismissal on November
20, 1992.
7.

(Attached as Exhibit 9.)
On December 18, 1992, Hausknecht requested a formal

evidentiary hearing before the UADD to review de novo the no cause
determination and order of the director.
8.

(Attached as Exhibit 10.)

On April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law

Judge for the Industrial Commission, issued a one page order
granting Hausknecht#s request for a formal evidentiary hearing.
(Attached as Exhibit 11.)
9.

On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for Review of

Judge Allen's Order with the Industrial Commission.

(Attached as

Exhibit 12.)
10.

On October 26, 1993, the Industrial Commission issued an

"Order Granting Motion for Review" finding that Hausknecht "failed
to submit any evidence in support of his claim during the UADD's
informal

investigation,"

The

text

of

that

Order, however,

mistakenly referred to the Motion for Review as being denied rather
than granted." (Emphasis added.)
11.

Consequently,

on

(Attached as Exhibit 1.)

November

4,

1993,

the

Industrial

Commission issued an Order of Clarification wherein it ordered that
"[Kennecott's] Motion for Review requesting that the evidentiary
hearing be denied is hereby granted and the decision of the

108331
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Administrative Law Judge to grant the evidentiary hearing is hereby
reversed."
12.

(Attached as Exhibit 2.)

As of December 6, 1993, Hausknecht had not filed a

petition for review or paid the statutory and docketing fees
required by Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
did lodge an "Appellant's Brief."
13.

He

(Attached as Exhibit 13.)

On December 9, 1993, Hausknecht filed with the Court of

Appeals a "Motion to Rename Document Entitled Appellant's Brief" as
a Petition for Review.
14.

Hausknecht's

(Attached as Exhibit 14.)
"Appellant's

Brief"

did

not

name

the

Industrial Commission of Utah as a respondent as required by Rule
14(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(Attached as

Exhibit 15.)
15.

Hausknecht did not file a docketing statement within 21

days of filing his "Appellant's Brief" as required by Rule 9(a) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(Attached as Exhibit 16.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outline the necessary
procedures for seeking judicial review of administrative orders.
Hausknecht did not file a petition for review within 30 days of the
Industrial Commission's final order and failed to comply with the
other

108331

procedures

for

perfecting

5

an

administrative

appeal.

Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the
appeal.
Even if jurisdiction were proper, Hausknecht's argument that
the Industrial Commission's Order denies him due process fails
because Hausknecht could have sought de novo review in the district
court.

Even so, due process does not entitle a charging party to

a formal evidentiary hearing. Hausknecht was given fair notice and
opportunity to be heard but did not meet his burden to establish a
prima facia case of age discrimination.
In

addition,

Hausknecht's

claim

that

the

Industrial

Commission's Order violates the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,
the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act and the Commission's rules are
insupportable. The statutory procedure established by those rules
and regulations specifically contemplates and authorizes the UADD
Director

to

dismiss

an

adjudicative

proceeding

where

the

investigator uncovers insufficient evidence to support the charging
party's allegations.
(1993).

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (4) (a) and (b)

A charging party who requests a review of that decision

must show that a hearing is necessary to add to the evidence in the
file or cause the evidence to be viewed differently.

Utah Code

Ann. § 34-35-7.1(4) (c) (1993); Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4 (4) (1993).
Hausknecht failed to make such a showing.

108331
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ARGUMENT
I.

HAUSKNECHTfS PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS UNTIMELY AND IMPROPERLY
PILED AND THIS COURT MUST THEREFORE DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION.
A.

The Petition for Review Was Not Filed Within 30 Days of
the Industrial Commission's Final Order.

The Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides for judicial
review of final agency orders.

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

14(3) (a) (1993) . The Act requires that a petition for review shall
be in the form required by the appellate rules and that the
appellate

rules

proceedings.

shall

govern

all

additional

filings

See Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(2)(a-b) (1993).

and
Rule

14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines the form
required for a petition for review and outlines the process for
initiating an appeal of an administrative order. See Utah R. App.
P. 14 (1994) .
Rule 14(a) requires that "a petition for review shall be filed
with the clerk of the appellate court within the time prescribed by
statute, or if there is no time prescribed, then within 30 days
after the date of the written decision or order." Utah R. App. P.
14(a) (1993)(emphasis added).

The statute in this case prescribes

that: "a party shall file a petition for judicial review of final
agency

action within

30 days

from the date

that

the order

constituting the final agency action is issued. . . ." Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-14(3) (a) (1993) . Accordingly, Hausknecht had 30 days

108331
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following the Industrial Commission's final order to file his
petition for review.
The Industrial Commission reminded Hausknecht of this 30-day
deadline in its October 26, 1993 Order Granting Motion for Review,1
and then again, nine days later, in its Order of Clarification
issued on November 4, 1993.2

In order to have been timely,

Hausknecht's appeal had to be filed within 30 days of the November
4, 1993 Order.

That 30-day period ended on Saturday, December 4,

1993. Hausknecht therefore had until the end of the next business
day, Monday, December 6, 1993, to file a petition for review. See
Utah R. App. P. 22(a) (1993).

Hausknecht did not file a petition

for review with the clerk on or before December 6, 1993.
On December 6, 1993 Hausknecht did attempt to initiate his
appeal by filing an "Appellant's Brief."
brief but would not allow it to be filed.

The clerk lodged3 the
(Attached as Exhibit

13.)

It was accepted for filing three days later on December 9,

1993.

(Attached as Exhibit 15.) On December 9, 1993, counsel also

filed a "Motion to Rename Appellant's Brief" as a petition for

1

Order Granting Motion for Review at 3 (attached as Exhibit

2

Order of Clarification at 1 (attached at Exhibit 2 ) .

1) .

3

In order to allow a party additional time to correct minor
errors or omissions, the court clerk will sometimes "lodge" a brief
to be filed after the time prescribed by the appellate rules. The
time for filing a petition for review, however, cannot be enlarged
by the Court. See Utah R. App. P. 22(b)(2) (1994).
108331
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review,4 clearly in an attempt to avoid the penalty for filing an
untimely petition for review.

(Attached as Exhibit 14,)

Of

course, lodging an appellant's brief is not the same as timely
filing a petition for review and paying the requisite fees.

The

time for filing a petition for review cannot be enlarged and
Hausknecht's

creative attempt

to turn back the clock cannot

succeed.
The fact that Hausknecht did not file a petition for review on
or before December 6, 1993 is dispositive in this case.

See

Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 860 P.2d
944,

945

(Utah App. 1993)

(Court of Appeals must determine

jurisdiction as a threshold matter).

It is well-settled law in

Utah that " [t]he timely filing of a petition for judicial review of
an Industrial Commission decision is jurisdictional."

Silva v.

Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App.
1990) (citing Leonczynski v. Board of Review. 713 P.2d 706 (Utah
1985).

Therefore, if Hausknecht's appeal was untimely, this

Court's authority extends no further than to dismiss the action.
Thompson v. Jackson. 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987); see

4

Kennecott did not object to Hausknecht's Motion to Rename
his "Appellant's Brief" because the more relevant issue was whether
Hausknecht had initiated his appeal by December 6, 1993. Kennecott
had no notice that an "Appellant's Brief" had been lodged and knew
only that Hausknecht had failed to file anything with the Court of
Appeals until December 9, 1993. Because nothing had been timely
filed, it became irrelevant whether the "Appellant's Brief" was
allowed to be renamed.
108331
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also. Prowswood. Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 676 P.2d 952,
955 (Utah 1984) ("It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure
to timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring
dismissal of the appeal.")
Moreover, because the 30-day statutory deadline creates a
jurisdictional limitation, even a short delay will not withstand
dismissal.

For example, in Varian-Eimac. Inc. v. Lamoreaux. 767

P.2d 569, 571 (Utah App. 1989), this Court specifically refused an
argument which would expand jurisdiction beyond that conferred by
the legislature in order to create an exception where filings are
only "one or two days late." Similarly, in Isaacson v. Dorius. 669
P.2d 849, 850 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal for lack of jurisdiction that was mailed four days before
the 30-day deadline but was not received for filing until two days
after that deadline.
This Court's jurisdiction over appeals from the Industrial
Commission is fixed by statute and cannot be ignored.

The fact of

the matter is that Hausknecht did not file a petition for review
with this Court on or before December 6, 1993.

Renaming an

"Appellant's Brief" that was filed three days late does not change
that fact.

Accordingly, the Court is without subject matter

jurisdiction and retains only the authority to dismiss the case.
Any further action in this matter would be improper. See Thompson
v.
108331

Jackson,

793

P.2d

1230,

1232
10

(Utah

App.

1987)

(where

jurisdiction lacking, improper for court to proceed other than by
dismissal).
B.

The Petition for Review Did Not Otherwise Comply with the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In addition to requiring that a petition for review be filed
within 30 days of the agency's final order, the Utah Rules of
Appellate

Procedure

contain

several

perfecting an administrative appeal.

other

requirements

for

For example, Rule 14(a) of

the appellate rules requires that the petition shall designate the
respondent (s) and
respondent.11

"[i]n each case the agency shall be named

Utah R. App. P. 14(a) (1993) (emphasis added).

Rule

14 (b) goes on to require that " [a] t the time of filing any petition
for review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk
of the appellate court such filing fees as are established by law,
and also the fee for docketing the appeal.

The clerk shall not

accept a petition for review unless the filing and docketing fees
are

paid."

Utah

R.

App.

P.

14(b)

(1993) (emphasis

added).

Hausknecht's "Appellant's Brief," which was filed as a petition for
review,

did

not

name

the

Industrial

Commission

of

Utah as

respondent5 nor did Hausknecht pay the required statutory and
docketing fees at the time of filing.6

5

See "Appellant's Brief" (attached as Exhibit 15).

6

See Notice dated January 13, 1994 (attached as Exhibit

17) .
108331
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Beyond that, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure further
require that " [w] ithin 21 days after a . . . petition for review is
filed, the . . . petitioner shall file a docketing statement with
the clerk of the appellate court."
(1993)(emphasis added).

Utah R. App. P. 9(a)

Hausknecht did not file a docketing

statement in this case until February 17, 1993, nearly two months
late.
As

See Docketing Statement (attached as Exhibit 16.)
demonstrated

above,

Hausknecht

did

not

meet

Utah's

mandatory procedural requirements for appealing an order of the
Industrial

Commission.

Hausknechtfs

Accordingly,

appeal

is

improper and this Court is without jurisdiction.7

II.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER VIOLATES NEITHER DUE PROCESS
NOR THE GOVERNING STATUTORY SCHEME.
Hausknecht

claims

that

Utah's

statutory

laws

governing

discrimination claims were violated by the Industrial Commission's
Order denying him an evidentiary hearing.

In turn, he argues that

"the Commission's refusal to allow [him] any type of hearing to
which he was entitled violates [his] fundamental due process right
to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal." Petitioner's

7

Hausknecht's apparent failure to read and apply the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure defeats the purpose of those rules,
which is to identify issues for judicial review in a timely and
orderly fashion.
As a policy matter, it therefore would be
inconsistent to allow Hausknecht's appeal to proceed given that the
appellate rules have been wholly ignored or disregarded.
108331
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Brief at 8. Specifically, Hausknecht charges that the denial of a
formal adjudicative hearing before the agency violates the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act,
and

the

Industrial

Commission's

Petitioner's Brief at 10.

own

Administrative

Rules.

Utah's statutory scheme has been

complied with, and that compliance has ensured the basic fairness
to which

Hausknecht

is

entitled.

Neither Utah's

governing

statutory scheme nor due process mandates that Hausknecht be
afforded a formal evidentiary hearing.
A.

Hausknecht Did Not Timely Raise the Issue That Failure to
Allow an Evidentiary Hearing would Violate His Due
Process Rights and That Issue Should Not Be Considered.

At no time prior to filing his Petitioner's Brief did
Hausknecht raise the issue that failure to grant an evidentiary
hearing would violate his due process right.

That issue was not

raised in his Notice of Evidentiary Hearing (attached as Exhibit
17) nor was it raised in response to Kennecott's Motion for Review,
which sought to overturn the ALJ's order granting an evidentiary
hearing. As a result, the Court should not now consider the issue
on review.

In State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993),

this Court held that appellate courts will not consider an issue
"including a constitutional argument" for the first time on appeal
absent plain error or exceptional circumstances. This rule applies
with greater force to non-criminal actions such as this.

108331
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See LMU

Leasing. Inc. v. Conlin. 805 P.2d 189, 197 (Utah App. 1991); Salt
Lake County v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989).

Hausknecht#s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated.

B.

Hausknecht argues that his due process rights were violated
because the Industrial Commission denied him a full evidentiary
hearing.

That argument fails for two reasons.

statutory

scheme

contemplates

that Hausknecht

First, Utah's
could

seek

an

evidentiary hearing before the district court. Second, due process
only requires that the process be fair and involve a procedure
appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved.
Hausknechtf s contention that he was denied due process because
the Commission denied him access to an evidentiary hearing is
incorrect. Although not entitled as a matter of right to a formal
adjudicatory

hearing

before

the UADD, Hausknecht

requested a trial de novo in the district court.

could

have

The director's

determination and order of dismissal was made as part of an
informal process, which when it becomes a final order of the
Commission, would be reviewable by trial de novo in the district
court.

See Utah Administrative Code R560-1-3(F)

(1994); Utah

Admin. Code R560-1-4 (A) (2) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (1) (e)
(1994).

Therefore, Hausknecht could have made a timely request to

the district court for review of the director's determination by
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trial de novo.

Instead, Hausknecht sought formal review by the

Industrial Commission.
Furthermore, as stated in Nelson v. Jacobson. 669 P.2d 1207,
1213 (Utah 1983) (citing Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338,
341 (Utah 1980)) , " [t]he demands of due process rest on the concept
of basic fairness of procedure and require a procedure appropriate
to the case and just to the parties involved."

The Utah Supreme

Court has held that a formal evidentiary hearing is not required to
satisfy the concept of basic fairness of procedure.

In Jones v.

Ogden Auto Body. 646 P.2d 703 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
specifically held that the Industrial Commission had not violated
the charging party's right to due process by adopting the findings
of its administrative law judge without holding an evidentiary
hearing and without entering findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

Id. at 705. The Supreme Court observed that the Industrial

Commission "shall review the entire record made in said case, and,
in its discretion may hold further hearings and make findings of
fact and enter its award thereon."

Id. (quoting U.S. Steel Corp.

v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807 (Utah 1980) (emphasis in
original).

In this case, the Commission reviewed the record and

found that Hausknecht' s burden had not been met and that an
evidentiary hearing was therefore unnecessary.
Hausknecht fails to recognize Jones or to cite any contrary
cases or statutes to support his position that due process, at a
108331
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minimum, mandates a formal hearing.

Rather, Hausknecht cites

distinguishable cases in which procedural due process was violated
during administrative hearings.

For example, in Anderson v.

Industrial Commission of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219
administrative

law judge who presided

(Utah 1985), the

over that hearing was

formerly an attorney for one of the plaintiffs.

In Bunnell v.

Industrial Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987), due
process was denied by the wrongful exclusion of testimony at the
hearing.

Similarly, in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818

P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991), the plaintiff was denied due process
because hearsay evidence was admitted at the hearing.
Even absent the right to a trial de novo, Hausknecht was
afforded

a process which was

appropriate

to

the

case

fair and

and

just

to

involved
the

a procedure

parties

involved.

Hausknecht had full and fair opportunity to participate in the
investigatory process that he initiated and to submit evidence for
consideration.

The fact that he did not produce evidence to meet

his burden of proving a prima facie case does not reduce the
process

to one of unfairness.

As found by the Commission,

Hausknecht "failed to submit any evidence in support of his claim
during the UADD's informal investigation. He did not complete and
sign

an

affidavit

upon

filing

his

charge

and

documentation or evidence in support of his claim.

108331
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submitted

no

Every document

submitted by the Charging Party was argument not evidence." Order
Granting Motion for Review at 2 (attached as Exhibit 1).
Nonetheless, the investigator

in this case attempted to

collect evidence, including a lengthy statement by Kennecott and
Kennecott's ten page response to a detailed set of investigative
questions and requests for documentation.

Attached as documents

responsive to those requests were 58 pages of detailed notes
relating

to

and

taken

contemporaneously

with

Kennecott's

investigation of Hausknecht's conduct, as well as a copy of
Kennecott's sexual harassment policy.8 Although Hausknecht replied
to this evidence submitted by Kennecott, he again failed to provide
the investigator with any specific evidence or affidavits, or even
to identify potential witnesses or supporting evidence.

Instead,

he responded solely by way of argument. See Order Granting Motion
for Review at 3 (attached as Exhibit 1).
Due process does not excuse a charging party's burden to
establish a prima facia case of discrimination.

In the litigation

process, parties are often necessarily required to meet their
initial burden without the prior benefit of a formal evidentiary

8

The evidence collected showed that: (1) Hausknecht's age
had nothing to do with Kennecott's decision to terminate his
employment; (2) Kennecott terminated Hausknecht's employment
because he engaged in conduct described as pervasive sexual
harassment and because his performance was unsatisfactory; and
(3) Hausknecht was not subject to disparate treatment. See UADD
Determination dated November 20, 1992 (attached as Exhibit 9).
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hearing (see, e.g. . motions for summary judgment) .

If it were

otherwise, anyone could obtain such a hearing for any reason or for
no reason.

Even the most expansive interpretation of due process

cannot condone such waste of administrative time and resources.
C.

The Procedures Followed in This Case Met the Requisite
Statutory Requirements.

Hausknecht's claim that Utah's governing statutory scheme was
violated in this case is unsupportable.

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-

7.1(1) (a) # provides that a person claiming employment discrimination may file a request for agency action with the Industrial
Commission of Utah. Hausknecht filed a claim of age discrimination
against Kennecott on or about May 12, 1992.

(Attached as Exhibit

4).
The

Act

requires

that

before

any

hearing

is

set, the

Industrial Commission shall assign an investigator to make a
prompt, impartial investigation of all allegations. Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-35-7.1 (3).9
Phillips

to

In this case, the Commission assigned Randall

investigate

Hausknecht's

allegations

of

age

discrimination.
If the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence to support
the allegations of discrimination, the Act requires that he or she

9

Utah Admin. Code R560-1-3(F) classifies the procedures
specified in Utah Code aim. § 34-35-7.1, subparts (1)-(5) as "an
informal process with no hearing and [which] are governed by
section 63-46b-5, U.C.A.", which sets forth the procedures for
informal adjudicatory proceedings.
108331

18

report these findings to the director*
7.1(4) (a).

Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-

After conducting his investigation in this case, Mr.

Phillips reported that "the facts in the record, viewed in their
entirety, indicate that there is NO REASONABLE CAUSE to believe
that Charging Party [Hausknecht] was subjected to discriminatory
practices as alleged." UADD Determination dated 11/20/92 (Emphasis
in original)(attached as Exhibit 9 ) .
The Act goes on to provide that " [u] pon receipt of the
investigator's report, the director may issue a determination and
order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceedings."
Ann. § 34-35-7.1(4) (b) .10
Fowler

issued

Utah Code

In compliance with that provision,

Director

Jay

an Order dismissing

Hausknecht's

charges.

UADD Order dated 11/20/92 (attached as Exhibit 9 ) .

Finally, the Anti-Discriminatory Act allows either party to
challenge a determination and order of the director by making a
written request to the director for a formal evidentiary hearing
"to review de novo the director's determination and order within 30
days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal."
Utah

Code Ann.

§ 34-35-7.1 (4) (c) .

Alternatively,

the Anti-

Discriminatory Act provides for informal review which culminates in

10

Utah Administrative Code R560-1-4, which "pertains to the
procedures specified in section 34-35-7.1 UCA" gives the Director
the option to request the Commission's legal staff to review an
investigatory file and make a recommendation, or the Director may
request the investigator to conduct a further investigation.
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a de novo trial before the district court.

See Utah Code Ann. §

63-46b-15 (district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de
novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative
proceedings).
On

December

18,

1992,

Hausknecht

requested

a

formal

evidentiary hearing to review de novo Director Fowler's dismissal.
Notice of Evidentiary Hearing dated 12/18/92 (attached as Exhibit
17) . A formal adjudicatory hearing before the agency, however, is
not a matter of right and must be shown to be necessary.
Admin. Code. R560 1-4(4) (1993).

Utah

Furthermore, "a hearing will not

be considered necessary if the hearing will not add to the evidence
in

the

investigatory

file

or

cause

the

investigatory file to be viewed differently.11

evidence
Id.11

in

the

It is the

Industrial Commission's finding under that rule to which Hausknecht
objects.

The Anti-Discriminatory Act, however, has been complied

with.
Hausknecht's argument that the applicable statutory scheme has
been

violated

Discriminatory

also
Act

ignores

the

specifically

fact

that

authorizes

the

Utah

dismissal

Antiof

the

adjudicative proceeding where there is insufficient evidence of

11

The Administrative Code further requires that a formal
hearing must be necessary to finally resolve the matter and that it
be appropriate to convert the matter to a formal adjudicative
proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(3). Utah Admin. Code
R560-1-5 (1994) .
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discrimination following an informal investigation. Utah Code Ann.
§ 34-35-7.1(4) (b) (1993).

The Utah Administrative Code further

explains that where a determination and order of dismissal is
entered by the director, a formal adjudicative hearing will not be
held by the Commission unless the request for an evidentiary
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order
was timely and shows that such hearing is necessary. See Utah
Admin. Code R560-1-5 (1993).

Hausknecht therefore cannot excuse

his burden to show that a hearing is necessary by arguing that the
Industrial Commission's Order violates the statutory law. As set
forth in part III below, Hausknecht did not make the necessary
showing to allow the Commission to grant an evidentiary hearing.
In short, Hausknecht's claims that the Utah anti-discrimination statutes and his right to due process were violated must fail
because (1) the Industrial Commission complied with the applicable
statutory schemes, (2) a formal evidentiary hearing is not required
to satisfy due process where an opportunity to be heard has been
afforded

within

the

relevant

statutory

scheme, and

(3) the

procedures embodied in the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act as well as
the Administrative Procedures Act gave Hausknecht the opportunity
to prove his prima facie case.
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III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT HAUSKNECHT DID
NOT SHOW AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO BE NECESSARY UNDER R5601-4.
The ultimate

issue

for resolution on appeal

is whether

Hausknecht was properly denied a formal hearing for failure to show
that such a hearing is necessary under Utah Administrative Code
R560-1-4.

Hausknecht argues the Industrial Commission of Utah

erred in finding and concluding that "Charging Party has failed to
show that an evidentiary hearing is necessary pursuant to the
requirements of R560-1-4." Order Granting Motion for Review at 3
(attached as Exhibit 1).

Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah Administrative

Code provides:
A request for an evidentiary hearing must state a reason
why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will not be
considered necessary if the hearing will not add to the
evidence in the investigatory file or cause the evidence
in the investigatory file to be viewed differently. In
most cases, the need to cross-examine the individuals who
have submitted affidavits supportive of the initial
finding or determination of the Commission will be
considered a valid reason for granting a request for a
hearing by the Commission.
Utah Admin. Code R560-l-4(4) (1993) .
Hausknecht's burden before the Commission was therefore to
show that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to "add to the
evidence in the investigatory file or cause the evidence in the
investigatory file to be viewed differently."
R560-1-4(A) (4)

(1993).

He did not meet

Utah Admin. Code

that burden.

The

Commission correctly applied the law to the factual record and
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reasonably

and

rationally

concluded

that

Hausknecht

was not

entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Utah Administrative Code
R560-1-4.
P.2d 965

See Johnson v. Department of Employment Security, 782
(Utah App. 1989)

(Court of Appeals will not disturb

application of law by the Industrial Commission to its factual
findings

unless

the

determination

reasonableness and rationality).

exceeds

the

bounds

of

Accordingly, this Court must

affirm the Industrial Commission's Order.
Hausknecht, argues in his brief that the Commission erred and
that a formal hearing was shown to be necessary because:

(1) There

was an insufficient collection of evidence; (2) cross examination
of witnesses is mandated; and (3) a hearing is necessary to compel
testimony

which

discrimination.

"might"

substantiate

his

allegation

Petitioner's Brief at 10-12.

of

age

Neither these

arguments, nor the record below, provide any basis for concluding
that the Commission's order exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality.
Hausknecht first argues that a hearing is necessary because
"other than certain cursory and conclusory statements submitted on
behalf

of the petitioner

and

respondent, there has been no

admissible evidence (other than petitioner's initial statement)
submitted

to

the

investigator."

Hausknecht mischaracterizes

Petitioner's

the record.

Brief

at 11.

As discussed above,

although Hausknecht did not avail himself of the opportunity to
108331
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submit or identify evidence, Kennecott cooperated fully with the
UADD's investigation and submitted considerable evidence, which
included a detailed response to the allegations of the charge as
well

as

a

detailed

information

by

the

response12

to

investigator.

the numerous
That

requests

information

for

included

Kennecott's own investigation notes and sexual harassment policy.
Hausknecht responded to Kennecott's information solely by argument.
See Order Granting Motion for Review at 2 (attached as Exhibit 1) ;
see also letter from Erik Strindberg to Jay Fowler dated July 22,
1992 (attached as Exhibit 7) . Based on this record, Hausknecht was
unable

to

convince

the

Industrial

Commission

that

hearing

was

necessary

to

the

evidentiary

review

a

formal

director's

determination and order of dismissal. Hausknecht is also unable to
show that the Commission's decision was unreasonable or irrational.
Moreover, the express purpose of a formal evidentiary hearing
is "to review de novo the director's determination and order."
Utah Admin. Code R560-1-4(A)(3) (1993).

It is not to reopen the

investigative process or raise new issues.

As the Industrial

Commission observed in this case, "a party should not be allowed to
obtain an evidentiary hearing by claiming that the UADD has failed
to

properly

investigate

the

subject

charge

when

the

party

requesting the hearing has failed to participate fully in the

12

See letter to Jay H. Fowler from James M. Elegante dated
June 10, 1992 (attached as Exhibit 6).
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proceeding below." Order Granting Motion for Review at 3 (attached
as Exhibit 1) .
Second, Hausknecht argues that a hearing is necessary to
cross-examine

witnesses, citing

Petitioner's Brief at 11.

a

criminal

case as support.

Here, however, Hausknecht is not a

criminal defendant but is the charging party in an administrative
matter whose initial burden it is to establish a prima facie case.
See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine. 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)
(In employment discrimination case it is plaintiff's burden to show
similarly situated employees were not treated equally and that the
defendant

intentionally discriminated against plaintiff.

The

burden then shifts to defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action.). The Commission found that
Hausknecht

did

not

submit

evidence

to

meet

his

burden.

Determination at 5 (attached as Exhibit 9) . Indeed, the fact that
Hausknecht did not meet his burden to show a prima facia case of
age discrimination meant that Kennecott was relieved of any burden
to defend against Hausknecht's allegation with affidavits or any
other evidence. The Commission made it very clear that it did not
need to reach the issue of whether Kennecott had a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct" as that burden "is relieved
by Charging Party's [Hausknecht] failure to establish a prima facie
case of age discrimination..."
Exhibit 9) .
108331
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submitted by Kennecott in dismissing Hausknecht's allegation and
the cross-examination contemplated by R560-l-4(4) was found to be
unnecessary.

Order Granting Motion for Review at 3 (attached as

Exhibit 1) .

Based on the record below, that finding does not

exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
Third, Hausknecht argues that a hearing is necessary so he can
obtain the testimony of Kennecott employees who would be reluctant
to testify unless subpoenaed.

Petitioner's Brief at 11-12.

This

issue was not raised below and thus cannot be the basis for reversing the Commission's order under the applicable standard of review.
Furthermore, Hausknecht has yet to identify any specific witnesses,
let alone the substance of any expected testimony, which might be
favorable to his position.

See Notice of Evidentiary Hearing

(attached as Exhibit 10).

Instead, he states only that "[a]

hearing would provide petitioner
Kennecott
position."

employees who may have

the opportunity
testimony

to subpoena

favorable

Petitioner's Brief at 11 (emphasis added).

to his

Hausknecht

attempts to buttress this argument by arguing that the investigation never sought any

testimony

from Kennecott's employees--

ignoring the fact that significant information from Kennecott's
employees

was

Hausknecht's

108331
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investigator

in

investigatory

response
request

to
for

information.13

Even so, the purpose of the evidentiary hearing is

not to conduct a fishing expedition, nor is it to identify and
collect evidence, but rather, to review for correctness the UADD
director's dismissal.

Recognizing this, the Industrial Commis-

sion's conclusion that an evidentiary hearing was not shown to be
necessary is both reasonable and rational.
Hausknecht was unable to show the Industrial Commission that
a hearing would add to the evidence in the investigatory file or
cause that evidence to be viewed differently because, quite simply,
there

was

no

evidence

of

age

discrimination

in

the

file.

Therefore, while Hausknecht argues that a hearing may be helpful to
his case, and criticizes the investigation for not substantiating
his unsupported claim, he offers nothing to show that the hearing
is necessary or that the Industrial Commission erred. Accordingly,
the Industrial Commission's Order must be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The Court should dismiss this case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Even if jurisdiction were proper, Kennecott asserts
that for the reasons set forth above, the Order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah denying Hausknecht's request for a formal

13

This evidence, however, did not provide support for
Hausknecht's prima facie case but rather went to the issue of
Kennecott's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.
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evidentiary

hearing

did

not

violate

Hausknecht's right to due process.

Utah

statutory

law nor

Hausknecht simply failed to

establish a prima facia case of age discrimination and further
failed to show that an evidentiary hearing is necessary.
Accordingly, Kennecott respectfully requests that the Court
dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction or that it affirm the
dismissal ordered by the Industrial Commission of Utah.
DATED this //'day of May, 1994.

BARBARA K. POLICH
JAMES M. ELEGANTE
ALAN K. FLAKE
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Attorneys for appellee,
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